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RECENT DECISIONS

general minority rule of contracts that the market value is to be determined as of the date of the breach, but then the court assumed that the
contract was breached as of the date of the repudiation. Even under
that minority rule, if the court had given recognition to the rule of the
Frost v. Knight case"" the result would have been to determine the
market value as of the date fiked for performance, because, under that
case, if the repudiation is not accepted the contract is not breached until
the time set for performance.
FINTAN

M.

FLANAGAN

Aliens-Validity of Marriage for Immigration Purposes-Defendants participated in civil marriage ceremonies with three refugees
in Paris, France, for the sole purpose of enabling these refugees to
enter the United States as spouses of honorably discharged American
veterans under the War Brides Act.1 The refugees were subsequently
admitted into the United States as such spouses, although the marriages
were never consummated and the parties in two of the cases involved
have never cohabited as husband and wife. Defendants were convicted

of a conspiracy to defraud the United States by the making of false
statements or concealing material facts from the immigration authorities.2 Held: Affirmed. No evidence of French law having been presented at the trial, it will be presumed that French law on the point is
the same as American law. Under American law these marriages would
not be valid. Furthermore, the validity of these marriages as such is not
in issue here, as the marriages were but one step in the defendants'
scheme to defraud the United States. The question whether the marriages might be valid for other purposes is of no importance. Lutwak
et al. v. United States, 344 U.S. 809 (1953), petition for rehearing
denied 73 S.Ct, 726.
The status of marriage has for many years occupied a position of
some importance under our imigration legislation. Under the Immigration Act of 1917,3 which, despite several amendments is still the basic
immigration law of this country,4 preferential treatment is accorded to
spouses of citizens or legal residents of the United States. This policy
is preserved in the Immigration Act of 1924,1 and the recent Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarran Act.6 In many
19 Supra, notes 13 and 4.
159 STAT. 659 (1945), 8 U.S.C. §232. The minority opinion expressly states,
and the majority opinion appears to concede, that the marriages in question
were ceremonially valid, at least in the sense that some judicial proceedings
would be necessary if the parties wished to be relieved of their marital
obligations. 71 L.Ed. 364 (1953).
2 Under 43 STAT. 153, 8 U.S.C. §220(c) (1946 ed.).
3 39 STAT.874 (1917).
4 KANsAs, U.S. IMmiGRATION Exc.usioN Am DEPorrATiON 103 (3rd ed. 1948).
5Sec. 4; 43 STAT. 153, 8 U.S.C. §220 (1946 ed.).
68 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. In particular, see 205(b).
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immigration and nationality cases, therefore, the question of what
constitutes a valid marriage within the meaning of these Acts has been,
and still is, one of decisive effect.
At first blush, the problem might appear capable of relatively simple
solution by the application of the familiar rule of conflict of laws that
a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. 7 The majority
in the principal case, however, clearly indicated that the above rule in
this connection is of little, if any, value, by stating that:
"With the legal consequences of such ceremonies under other
circumstances, either in the United States or France, we are not
concerned.""
Another possible solution of our problem might be reached by
looking to the law generally prevailing in American jurisdictions. The
majority in the principal case appears to assume that the marriages in
question would, under American law, be invalid. If by that the Court
means that the marriages would be null and void, the validity of that
assumption is somewhat doubtful; the rule which seems to represent
the weight of American authority on the point has been stated in the
following terms:
"Once a marriage has been properly solemnized and the obligations of married life undertaken, its -validity cannot be affected by
an antenuptial agreement that the marriage should not be valid
and binding, nor because one or even both of the parties did not
intend it to be a permanent relation."
Be that as it may, the majority in the principal case clearly indicated
that this test also is unlikely to be of much practical help.' 0
It would thus appear that marriage under our immigration laws has
a meaning separate and distinct from its general legal interpretation.
This assumption finds strong support in the following language of the
majority in the principal case:
"The common understanding of a marriage, which Congress
must have had in mind when it made provision for 'alien spouses'
in the War Brides Act, is that the two parties have undertaken
to establish a life together and assume certain duties and
obligations.""'
The above definition, of course, is authority only with respect to the
7

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

871

L.Ed. 361 (1953).

§121, 132-134 (1934).

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 3
NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

(1946) and cases there cited; See, also,
§31.01 (1945) and cases there cited; See,
notes 14 A.L.R.2d 620 (1950); DeVries v. DeVries, 195 Ill.
App. 4 (1915),
involving a marriage ostensibly entered into for the sole purpose of nullifying
a contract of employment, and Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass 154, 191 N.E. 673
(1934) involving a sham marriage entered into for the purpose of obtaining

9KEEZER,

a salary increase.
20 See note 8, supra.

-1-71 L.Ed. 360 (1953).
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War Brides Act. 12 The question remains, however, whether this test is
applicable to the remainder of our statutory immigration law.
A search of our immigration statutes reveals two provisions which
might be of possible value. Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act of
192413 provides as follows:
...
any alien who at any time after entering the United States
is found to have secured a. . visa through fraud, by contracting
a marriage which, subsequent to entry into the United States, has
been judicially annulled retroactively to the date of marriage,
shall be taken into custody and deported ... on the ground that
at time of entry he was not entitled to admission, on the visa
presented upon arrival in the United States."
There appear to be no decisions directly involving the interpretation
of the above provision. An examination of its language, however,
appears to indicate that it can not be safely relied upon as a test of a
valid marriage for immigration purposes. The decision in the principal
case itself indicates that the mere fact that a marriage has not been
judicially annulled subsequent to entry in the United States does not
necessarily indicate that such marriage satisfies the requirements of the
immigration laws.
Another statutory provision of possible value is found in Section
101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,14 which reads
as follows:
"Definitions . . .
(35) The term 'spouse,' 'wife' or 'husband' do [sic] not include
a spouse wife or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony
where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in
the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been
consummated."
The above provision appears to have been designed to prevent the
utilization of so-called proxy marriages for obtaining the preference
provided for under the Act. 15 Whether, by application of the principle
of inclusio unius, exclusio alterius, it might be argued that all other
ceremonially valid marriages satisfy the requirements of the Act, is
highly doubtful.
The only safe conclusion under these circumstances appears to be
that attorneys engaged in immigration practice should not advise their
clients to apply for preferential treatment as spouses of American
citizens or residents under existing immigration statutes, unless such
clients are parties to a marriage which fully satisfies the test laid down
by the majority of the principal case.
GEoRGE G. LoRINCZI
12 Supra, note 2.
13 Supra, note 5.

24 Supra, note 6.
i5 Supra, note 6.

